Abstract: Neoliberal development processes are increasingly pervasive across the globe, but they are incorporated unevenly into social systems at the micro-level with varying ramifications for the sustainability of social institutions. This paper investigates how kinship relates to ecology and exposure to development in two villages of Humla District, Nepal. A geospatial analysis using ArcGIS software, combined with ethnographic techniques, offers visual representation of socio-ecological information that could facilitate the application of social scientific knowledge to a variety of issues in sustainable community development. The findings we present suggest that increasing integration with a market economy and other outside influences exaggerated differences in social networks. Specifically, we found that those villages with more development activity had more dispersed households and fewer social resources at home. This was in part the trade-off for increased connections abroad and in cities around Nepal. We explore the potential impacts of diffused social networks on long-term vulnerability. NGO staff working to maintain the sustainability of development's successes in the region will need to include the dynamics of local social networks in their analyses.
Development and Kinship
The Maoist conflict in Nepal (1996 Nepal ( -2006 ) offered a window into development's disruptive influence on vulnerability, as Nepal's conflict hotspots coincided with regions of the most intense development activity in Nepal [16, 31] . The case study presented here provides further evidence that disturbances in social and political organization may be common byproducts of development, despite claims to the contrary [see 33].
The conflict was partly the result of disillusionment with a democracy that was failing to provide material relief from scarcity [6, 11, 30] Women and other disadvantaged groups, in particular, responded in ways that highlight the role of social resources in vulnerability.
Using a combination of ethnographic and GIS techniques in Humla District, Nepal, we explored differences in ecology, development, and social networks that appeared to be linked to the way villagers responded to political change agents in the two villages. We discuss possible mechanisms for the link we observed between kin networks and vulnerability to conflict. This discussion implicates development as an inherently destabilizing force in such settings, and suggests that developers minimize vulnerability to risk through greater attention to their impacts on social institutions.
Partly in response to the shortfalls of new economic and development-related processes, the Maoist conflict gained swift momentum in Nepal's rural areas. Humlis began hearing Maoist messages about the evils of imperialism and caste and gender inequality via travel and on their battery-operated radios before they encountered the Maoist guerrillas in person. In 2001, the extreme paramilitary measures taken by the Nepalese government and the repercussions of US classification of the Maoist combatants as terrorists escalated the conflict throughout Nepal i [6] . At that time, Maoist combatants entered even more remote territories, including Humla. They attempted to draft one member from each household to porter, cook for, or take part in the armed resistance. Pettigrew's [23] analyses of these interactions in another part of Nepal concluded that rural villagers responded to Maoist combatants in complex ways, negotiating fear, idealism, and social institutions by deploying cultural conventions in unconventional ways. Humlis' responses were similarly ambivalent, and in fact were divergent among villages.
In the two villages represented in this case study, how people perceived and coped with the insurrection appeared to be associated with differing development levels and the divergent kinship densities that we observed. The rise of both Nepali democracy and the development industry since the early 1990s has presented new social networking opportunities to Humlis as well as exposing them to new risks and vulnerabilities. These changes, mediated by access to varying ecologies, appear to be reducing kinship as a central organizing principle in favor of market-oriented connections in parts of the region. Development dynamics intensified the distant, short-term, non-kin nature of relationships at the expense of local, sustaining networks in processes we describe in depth elsewhere [28] [29] .
Humla is a northwestern Himalayan district, widely considered the most remote of Nepal's 75 districts. Like in other communities dependent on subsistence-based productive activities, Humlis' social and political networks, until recently, have been primarily kinship-based [14, 20, cf. 8] . That is, most exchanges of labor and goods occurred on the basis of consanguinal, affinal, or fictive relatedness.
Thakuris make up all but a few households in the fieldsite and constitute a small but tightlyknit and distinctive enclave in Western Nepal. They are the second-highest caste in the Nepali caste system. They have the reputation among Chhetri and ethnic Tibetan populations in the region for being proud, despite their inability to achieve the food security or surpluses of their lower-caste neighbors [18, 22] . Very little ethnographic research has centered on this group of Nepalis [see, e.g. 31].
Relatedness is extremely important to Thakuris in Humla. Kinship functions to maintain a resource pool for the exchange of goods and ideas in what we observed to be a constantly rotating system of small-scale, informal credit. Kinship rules designate who Thakuris will marry (usually, other
Thakuris with a different surname) and where they will travel to live (especially if they are female).
Kinship structures their agricultural cycles, and the amount of labor they can count on to accomplish the challenging tasks of agriculture and livestock management in the Himalayas. Kinship is central to the maintenance of caste and status. When asked about who in the village they were related to, many villagers responded, "everyone, we are all family" as a statement of the highest form of solidarity with the neighbors with whom they lived and worked.
In this region, the practice of agriculture is inseparable from villagers' notions of kinship and identity as Hindu-observing Thakuris. In one of the villages in the fieldsite, Paschimgaon ii , inhabitants were relatively cut off from other villages by geological features including forests, rivers, streams, and Uttargaon was home to one of the few secondary schools in the region, which further intensified villagers' exposure to Nepali schoolteachers from Nepal's urban centers and students from around the district. associations came to light as we mapped resources and kinship in ArcGIS in a process described below. Kin relationships took on varying meanings in the two settings in ways that appeared to be connected to the uneven disbursal of development benefits in Humla. Development trends somewhat bypassed Paschimgaon villagers and left them out of the national political discourse (see Table 1 ), but they were less vulnerable to some types of political manipulation that put some people at higher risk for conscription in Uttargaon [cf. 19]. We were interested in understanding how the geospatial characteristics in the fieldsite shaped the phenomena we observed, so we calculated the geographical distance between households of related individuals. In order to do this, we plotted the coordinates of each household with a Vista HCx Etrex Garmin GPS in the field. We then identified the households of consanguinal (blood-related) and affinal (marriage-related) relatives in the fieldsite from survey responses. We mapped 802 consanguinal and affinal relationships among the 128 households and 25 lineages of the two villages using the XY-toline function (each line represents a relationship) in Esri's ArcGIS v 10 and calculate the distances in meters between each represented relationship in ArcGIS. These data were recorded for the same households in which we conducted the ethnographic interviews described above. In the open source social network analysis software program, Gephi, we calculated measures of network centrality in kin networks in order to ascertain differences in the structure of kin networks.
Social network analysts often measure an individual's centrality in a network in terms of the proportion of pairs to the number of pairs possible, or "degree" [cf. 10]. Each individual's degree, averaged for the entire network, is called network "density" [34], so we were able to compare Paschimgaon and Uttargaon's kin densities to verify the visuals generated in ArcGIS.
Statistical analyses in IBM SPSS 20 enhanced the network analysis and allowed us to characterize the geospatial relationships revealed in ArcGIS. We rely on descriptive statistics, correlations, and mean comparisons to quantify the relationships described here. Other researchers include a geospatial component in their social network analyses [4] because space takes on added importance in a fieldsite where topography is a major factor in decision making.
Qualitative data from the authors' extensive fieldwork conducted between 1995 and 2013 provide explanations for the mechanisms by which the quantified associations operate, and contextualize the findings. 2009 was a fruitful time to explore variations in these villagers' responses to community development projects and personnel. Three years after the Maoist conflict had ended, its consequences were still fresh in people's minds and played out in day-to-day interactions, but enough time had passed that development organizations had fully resumed services after the hiatus forced on many of them during the decade-long armed rebellion. In 2009 and 2010, Humlis were contending with change on three primary fronts. First, they were experiencing the victorious Maoist regime in its transition from war to peacetime. Second, development organizations were re-establishing themselves in the region in the post-insurrection setting. And third, Humlis were reconciling their own vision of the future while experiencing more external influences than at any time in history.
Kinship and Risk-Taking in Nepal
As of 2010, Paschimgaon and Uttargaon had comparable population structures. Paschimgaon (Figure 2) , and also reflect important differences in the structure of kinship in the two villages. These differences exist despite the villages being of similar size, religious orientation, ethnic make-up, age-structure, and geographical location.
In Uttargaon, we see far more relationships external to the village as a result of migration for labor, denoting Uttargaon's relatively higher level of external social capital [cf.32], or long-distance kin relationships (Figure 3; Tables 2-3 ). Uttargaon villagers are more willing to travel outside their village in search of familial and economic opportunities. Our ethnographic work and interviews verified that this was attributable to their relatively poorer agricultural productivity. By contrast, measures of network centrality in Gephi revealed that Paschimgaon villagers were more closely-related. They had higher local network density and more kin relationships (or mean degree) than Uttargaon (Table 4) 
Kinship and Decision-Making about Joining the Conflict
The Maoist conflict deeply impacted the nation of Nepal, but it was also local and personal.
Locally, it constituted leverage in social schisms. During and following the conflict, villagers did not simply throw off their age-old grievances to adopt new ones. They incorporated the titles of new political parties in a deepening expression of division. Landowner-versus-landless disputes gained new momentum when they bifurcated along national party lines and became the basis for ongoing retribution [see also 23] .
Maoist combatants new to the area capitulated in local disputes by acting on behalf of villagers who claimed political loyalty. In Humla District, the process of recruiting members and labor for the revolution was occasionally violent, but it also involved considerable negotiation with local people.
Negotiations with the Maoists reflected the ambiguity with which Maoists and villagers viewed one another, and the ways in which kinship factored into experiences of the conflict. At times, the Maoists excused villagers from service when they knew the household was too poor and/or did not have enough members to provide for them in addition to service. In other homes, the Maoists were less flexible for what appeared to be political reasons.
Women, in particular, exercised agency in the conflict in ways that both challenged and women who participated in the Maoist campaign from our fieldsite disproportionately exercised their own will in order to do so, compared to male participants (Figure 4 ). In general, female volunteers for Maoist duty came from lower status homes in which there were few other opportunities for social mobility. Because most women conflict participants chose to participate, we could compare socialspatial relationships in the two villages that may have mediated female decisions about the conflict. In Uttargaon, we found that the women who participated in the conflict were from quite a few different lineages. However, in Paschimgaon, only two lineages capture nearly all the female conflict participants in the village ( Figure 5 ). Figure 5 . Nearly all of the female conflict participants from Paschimgaon were from just two lineages Statistical and ethnographic evidence suggests that a higher reliance on kin may protect people from the risks inherent in the kind of political conflict that accompanied the civil conflict in Nepal. The households in which women opted out of conflict participation, on average, were related to 29 nearby households, or five more than those from which women participated in the conflict, suggesting that certain Humlis with vaster social support through kin may have been more confident or better able to leverage political sway to deny the Maoists their conscription process.
We know that the converse was true. A common narrative told by Uttargaon villagers described a process by which longstanding household rivalries took on national political party names. When the Maoists arrived on the scene, rivals pointed the soldiers to certain families for harsher conscription, and the Maoists often responded by drafting them for longer terms and/or to more dangerous regions affected by intense conflict. In one powerful Uttargaon household all four brothers had been drafted against their wills despite the Maoists' ek ghar ek maanchhe ("one household, one man") rule for conscription. Most likely as a result of this infighting, Uttargaon villagers also took on greater risk in order to escape Maoist terms (Table 5 ). In surveys, Uttargaon villagers mentioned that they experienced more social disturbances during the conflict as a result of political divisions within the village. We suggest that Uttargaon villagers' differing experiences of the conflict were partially the result of prior, successful development that had facilitated the connection of these villagers' social 
Faux Foes? Development Workers and The Maoists
Through the varying influence of development organizations (including NGOs and private businesses), individuals in remote regions connect to business associates, friends, and formal education opportunities locally and in urban centers; access communications technologies and other media; and generally grow more independent of their traditionally dense, kin-based networks, and more conversant in the languages of national/ international-level politics and ideologies [13, 27] .
In turn, expanded social networks affect human decision making by providing alternative avenues for the diffusion of goods and information [1, 3, 12] . But, not all individuals are able to invest in development programs, so neoliberal aid programming in particular has also been accused of contributing to widening gaps between rich and poor [25] . In Humla District, these gaps have geospatial and social network components that revealed important inter-village differences in peoples' abilities to confront and withstand the political turmoil that accompanied the Maoist conflict in Nepal.
The extension of social networks through migration and diversification of assets accompanying development may have primed Uttargaon villagers for a bright future of engagement with novel opportunities in the region. In the meanwhile, however, it has increased their vulnerability to the negative aspects of change, such as political conflict and development at the expense of well-being, as we have discussed elsewhere [28] . We posit that the well-established development paradigm in place prior to the strife had not only scattered Uttargaon villagers and acquainted them with the language of revolution, but increased their willingness to act as independent agents in the conflict and segregated the villagers among rival political parties. The contrast with Paschimgaon is reflected in the structure of kin networks we examine here and affected the ways Humlis experienced the Maoist conflict.
Humlis' social acceptance of conflict participation was unexpected, and pointed out the complementarity in villagers' engagements with both development and conflict. Statistical analyses revealed a significant positive correlation between conflict participation terms and technological adoption for both villages (Table 6 ). Critics of the development regime tend to regard its unraveling impact on traditional kin relations (like those observed in Uttargaon) as unique to the development realm, but the analyses detailed above reveal that these processes are not strictly development-oriented.
They stemmed from agricultural inequalities [cf. 2] and they were also intensified by unlikely allies, the Maoists [cf. 17]. The Maoist campaign in Nepal served to mobilize people across space, privilege national identities above kinship, and advocate for gender and caste equality and education for all as a means to elevate the poor. These trends helped stretch and extend the social networks of Humlis who were in a position to benefit, i.e. those who, due to scarcity and through development opportunities like access to formal education, had spearheaded local development. Villagers saw the Maoists as a) agents of development who could bring them technical help, much as NGO or government workers had done in the past, and b) outsiders whose motives required wariness, as with NGO and government entities.
Both the Maoists and the development workers, then, theoretically presented a conundrum to villagers who wanted the development and symbols of progress that they brought, but who were suspicious of what they might be asked to give up in return. They had been on the unfortunate end of asymmetrical development, largely due to their position at the geographical margins of Nepali society, since unification in the late 18 th century, and had reason to be cautious [see 9]. In response to the risks presented by outsiders, villagers drew from the resources locally available to them. But, for Uttargaon villagers, some of those resources, i.e. kin networks, had been re-positioned and were unavailable in the way in which they had been accustomed.
This analysis suggests that development programs facilitate the kinds of long-distance kin relationships and non-kin social connections that ultimately politicized certain villagers and made them more vulnerable prior to the conflict. The politically-savvy-but-divided villagers seemed to experience harsher conscription. Increased vulnerability operated through the byproducts of successful development endeavors that introduced alternatives to especially poor agricultural productivity among Uttargaon villagers, but may have left individuals more isolated in their home village. Our analysis has
shown that dense kin networks may help absorb risk. The ethnographic analysis provided here references the ambiguity of development, whereby concepts of the self and community found fertile ground for growth in two modern, ostensibly opposing entities: the Maoists and "imperialist" proponents of aid. International aid and conflict have a lot in common, in that they are forms of revolution that are usually imposed from the outside. More importantly, they are made up of actors who have a somewhat unified vision of a better world, but who are nevertheless simultaneously navigating the competing goals of self, family, community, nation, and world. The way locals perceive themselves to be connected to those various scales of kinship determines the social resources at their disposal to negotiate both reality and idealism in increasingly scarce environments [21] .
Unfamiliar events and processes confer great risk to individuals, especially if those events and technologies affect the ways in which people can earn or provide a living or relate to one another [7, 26] . Changes in social institutions are often accompanied by increased uncertainty and the threat of violence [15] . The major changes affecting Humlis' lives in the past generation have been ecological declines that limited the food security and nutritional diversity of their resource base, rapid development processes that stretched and expanded the social resources on which individuals rely to mitigate risk, and the Maoist conflict that brought national-level political upheaval and violence irrevocably to their doorstep. These change processes combined in unexpected ways to create vortexes of vulnerability observable in ArcGIS to which only certain individuals were relatively immune, based by all appearances on the structure of their historically-situated social relationships.
